Efeito das conexões políticas e da corrupção no desempenho econômico empresarial no âmbito da Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18568/internext.v18i3.745

Palavras-chave:

Conexões políticas, Corrupção, Dependência de recursos, Desempenho econômico

Resumo

Objetivo: Investigar os reflexos das práticas de conexões políticas e de corrupção no desempenho econômico de empresas condenadas por corrupção pela Securities and Exchange Commission por violarem a Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Método: A amostra reúne 131 companhias, responsáveis por 138 casos, desde o início da vigência da FCPA, em 1978, até 2019. Aplicaram-se técnicas de estatística descritiva, comparação de médias e regressão linear múltipla.

Principais Resultados: O desempenho econômico das empresas foi explicado positivamente por práticas integradas de conexões políticas e corrupção. Verificou-se um movimento crescente no desempenho dessas empresas na extensão temporal das práticas, registrando-se o maior desempenho no ano da condenação.

Relevância / Originalidade: O estudo supre lacunas na literatura, ao envolver, de forma integrada, as práticas de corrupção corporativa e conexões políticas no desempenho econômico empresarial, assim como a análise desse desempenho na extensão do tempo, em torno da prática de corrupção.

Contribuições Teóricas / Metodológicas: Contribui-se para a literatura ao relacionar os construtos à teoria da dependência de recursos. Os resultados alcançam as organizações, o Estado e os stakeholders em geral, que servirão para subsidiar decisões e políticas que digam respeito ao controle da corrupção e à manutenção de alianças. No entanto, o resultado pode representar uma disfunção socioeconômica, já que tais práticas não são benéficas para a economia no contexto organizacional, não podendo ser legitimadas independentemente dos fins desejados.

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Biografia do Autor

Danival Sousa Cavalcante, Universidade Federal do Ceará – Fortaleza (CE), Brasil.

Professor da Universidade Federal do Ceará

Marcia Martins Mendes De Luca, Universidade Federal do Ceará – Fortaleza (CE), Brasil.

Professora da Universidade Federal do Ceará

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Publicado

2023-09-04

Como Citar

Cavalcante, D. S., & De Luca, M. M. M. (2023). Efeito das conexões políticas e da corrupção no desempenho econômico empresarial no âmbito da Lei Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . Internext, 18(3). https://doi.org/10.18568/internext.v18i3.745

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